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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jessica Ibarra raised two issues in these cases.  First, she argued the district court should
have suppressed the evidence found in Docket Number 44949 because the totality of the
circumstances showed jail officials were unlawfully restricting her limited liberty rights at the
time she discarded the evidence in question.  Second, she contended the district court abused its
discretion by imposing excessive sentences in both cases on appeal.
This reply is needed to address the State’s response on the suppression issue, which threw
out several red herrings which are not relevant to the issue Ms. Ibarra raised on appeal.  It also
failed  to  apply  the  proper  test  for  evaluating  the  reasonableness  of  the  officers’  conduct,  as  it
focused on individual factors in isolation, rather than assessing the totality of the circumstances.
Similarly, its argument as to whether Ms. Ibarra’s discarding of the container was the product of
the unlawful police conduct fails to utilize the proper causation analysis.  Instead, it used an
analysis which several courts have explained is improper.  As such, the State’s arguments on the
suppression issue are meritless.
Since the reasonable basis which had justified the officers’ initial intrusion into
Ms. Ibarra’s rights had dissipated, they went beyond what was reasonable by continuing to
subject her liberty to additional restrictions, and so, their actions were not permissible under the
Fourth Amendment.  As a result, Ms. Ibarra could properly assert that the evidence she discarded
while she was being unlawfully detained should have been suppressed because that evidence was
fruit of the officers’ unlawful conduct.  The district court erred by not suppressing that evidence.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms. Ibarra’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
I. Whether the district court erred by denying Ms. Ibarra’s motion to suppress in the
contraband case.
II. Whether the district court abused its discretion in both cases by imposing excessive




The District Court Erred By Denying Ms. Ibarra’s Motion To Suppress In The Contraband Case
A. Analyzed Under The Proper Standard, The Totality Of The Circumstances Reveal That
The Officers’ Decision To Continue Subjecting Ms. Ibarra To Additional Restrictions Of
Her Limited Liberty Interest Was Not Reasonable
The State’s myopic focus on the idea that, because Ms. Ibarra was already lawfully
incarcerated, handcuffing her and keeping her in a different area of the jail was not an
unconstitutional  seizure,  ignores  the  context  in  which  that  decision  was  made,  and  so,  fails  to
apply the proper test and evaluate the totality of  the  circumstances.   (See Resp. Br., pp.8-11.)
Since its argument did not apply the proper test to assess the reasonableness of the officer’s
actions, its argument in that regard should be rejected.
While jail officials may impose additional restrictions on an inmate’s limited liberty
interests, the touchstone for judging the propriety of those additional restrictions is, as with any
other intrusion into a person’s Fourth Amendment rights, reasonableness – the additional
restrictions need to reasonably serve  the  jail’s  interest  to  be  permissible  under  the  Fourth
Amendment. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 339
(2012); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979); cf. State v. Rios, 160 Idaho 262, 264 (2016)
(reiterating the standard for evaluating Fourth Amendment issues).  Violations of a detainee’s
Fourth Amendment rights, like any other violations of the Fourth Amendment, are evaluated
based on the totality of the circumstances. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 327 (“there is no
mechanical way to determine whether intrusions on an inmate’s privacy are reasonable.  The
need for a particular search must be balanced against the resulting invasion of personal rights.”)
(internal citation omitted).   Thus,  when the totality of the circumstances show such restrictions
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do not reasonably serve the jail’s security interests, when the restrictions are exaggerated beyond
what is necessary, they “cannot be condoned.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 560 (explaining such restraints
are particularly troubling when the person is, like Ms. Ibarra was, a pre-trial detainee, because
the unreasonable restraints amount to “punishment”).
The  State  attempts  to  distinguish Bell based on the idea that Bell “details Fifth
Amendment standards relating to punishment and exaggerated jail official responses,” and
“[Ms.] Ibarra never claimed there was a Fifth Amendment violation or an unlawful search.”
(Resp. Br., p.11.)  That assertion wholly misunderstands the issue Ms. Ibarra raised on appeal, as
well as Bell itself.  As the United States Supreme Court has made clear, “[t]he Court’s opinion in
Bell v. Wolfish, . . . , is the starting point for understanding how this framework [regarding
detainee’s limited constitutional rights] applies to Fourth Amendment challenges.” Florence,
566 U.S. at 326 (emphasis added).  Within that Fourth Amendment framework, Ms. Ibarra is
challenging  the  seizure  and  search  of  the  plastic  container  that  was  found  in  the  booking  area
because it was found as a result of the officers unlawfully continuing to subject her to additional
restraints of her liberty.  (See, e.g., App. Br., p.17.)  That claim is wholly a Fourth Amendment
claim,  and  so,  the  State’s  arguments  against Bell because there were no Fifth Amendment
violation is a red herring.
Furthermore, all the State’s arguments regarding the reasonableness of the jail officials’
actions leading up to Ms. Ibarra’s detention in the booking area, such as their decision to strip
search  Ms.  Ibarra  or  the  decision  to  have  her  use  the  port-o-potty,  are  also  red  herrings.   (See
Resp. Br., pp.8-11.)  Ms. Ibarra is not challenging those actions as being unreasonable in and of
themselves; rather, she is asserting that, once all those extensive searches revealed no evidence
of contraband, the justification for detaining her, for infringing on her limited liberty rights,
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dissipated.  As a result, she is contending the officers’ decision to continue to subject her to
additional restrictions at that point was unlawful because continuing to impose those additional
restrictions was arbitrary and amounted to punishment. Cf. State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 235, 238
(Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that, though the traffic stop in that case was initially valid, it
devolved into an unlawful detention, and, as a result, the passenger could challenge the evidence
found after the detention became unlawful).  The arbitrariness of the officers’ actions in this case
is particularly evident when their treatment of Ms. Ibarra is compared to the treatment of their
other two women they were investigating –the other two women were allowed to return to their
cells otherwise unrestrained after being subjected to a similar battery of searches. Bell, 441 U.S.
at 539 (“if a restriction is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary and
purposeless—a court may permissibly infer that the purpose of the governmental action is
punishment that may not be constitutionally inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.”).
Accordingly, the proper inquiry in this case is whether the totality of the circumstances
show the officers’ decision to continue detaining Ms. Ibarra in handcuffs in the booking area
were “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Florence, 566 U.S. at 326 (internal
quotation omitted).  If they were not, those intrusions against Ms. Ibarra’s admittedly-limited,
but  still-existent,  expectation  of  privacy  would  violate  the  Fourth  Amendment,  and  “[s]uch  an
abuse cannot be condoned.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 560.
Naturally, one of the circumstances to be considered in that evaluation is the jail’s
interest in institutional security and deterring possession of contraband in that facility. Id. at 328;
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528 (1984).  However, the totality of the circumstances in this
case reveals the jail officials did everything they lawfully could without a warrant, and there is
no evidence were seeking or could have secured a warrant at that time.  (See App. Br., pp.15-16.)
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Because they had conducted an extensive investigation of Ms. Ibarra and found no evidence of
contraband, the jail’s security interests were not reasonably served by continuing to subjecting
her to the additional restrictions from that point forward.
The  State’s  argument  did  not  evaluate  the  totality  of  the  circumstances.   Rather,  it
evaluated the decision to handcuff and detain Ms. Ibarra in the booking area in isolation from the
events leading up to it.  (See, e.g., Resp. Br., p.11 (arguing that, “[g]iven the ubiquitous use of
handcuffs in jail, [Ms.] Ibarra fails to show that simple handcuffing here . . . would have
qualified as an ‘exaggerated’ police response”).)  The premise of the State’s argument is actually
belied by the fact that the officers allowed the other two inmates they were investigating to return
to their cells otherwise unrestrained after being similarly searched.  (See R., pp.127-28.)
Therefore, despite the “ubiquitous use” of handcuffs in jails, they are not constantly used, nor are
they necessary to promote jail security in scenarios such as Ms. Ibarra’s.
The bigger problem with the State’s argument, however, is its attempt to argue that, since
each aspect of the officers’ actions might be independently reasonable, their whole course of
conduct must have been reasonable.  (See Resp. Br., pp.8-11.)  That argument is not a proper
application  of  the  totality-of-the-circumstances  framework.   Just  as  a  combination  of
individually-innocent factors may add up to reasonable suspicion when viewed in totality,
State v. Kelley, 159 Idaho 417, 424 (Ct. App. 2015), a combination of individually-reasonable
actions by the officer may add up to a Fourth Amendment violation when viewed in totality.  It
all depends on the context in which those otherwise-appropriate action occur. See id.
Therefore, considering the officers’ actions in context, considering the totality of the
circumstances, the decision to keep Ms. Ibarra handcuffed in the booking area was not
reasonably connected to the interest of jail security after the officers had strip searched her
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several times, had a drug dog sniff her and her cell, which they also searched themselves,
collected her waste under supervision, and found no contraband.  (See App. Br., p.12 (detailing
the  officer’s  actions  leading  up  to  the  problematic  actions).)   At  that  point,  Ms.  Ibarra’s  rights
had given way to the jail’s security interest, and that interest had been reasonably addressed by
the multitude of searches the officers conducted.  Whatever reasonable suspicion they had to
justify that intrusion on Ms. Ibarra’s limited privacy right had dissipated at that point.  Therefore,
the totality of the circumstances shows there was no reasonable justification for continuing to
impose on that right, which means continuing to do so violated the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, the State’s myopic focus on just the use of handcuffs and placement within the
facility, without considering the context in which those facts existed, represents a failure to apply
the proper standard for evaluating Ms. Ibarra’s Fourth Amendment claim, and so, should be
rejected.
B. Using The Appropriate Analysis Reveals The Unreasonable Decision To Continue
Subjecting Ms. Ibarra To The Additional Restrictions Caused Her To Discard The Plastic
Container
The State’s argument on the abandonment aspect of this issue also fails to apply the
proper test.  In fact, its argument ignores the warnings several courts have given about
improperly conflating the concepts of “intentional” action and “coerced” action in the context of
abandonment.   (See Resp. Br., pp.15-16.)  Nearly all abandonment cases involve “intentional”
action on the defendant’s part, as the defendant will intentionally decide to discard the property
or disavow ownership of it.  However, focusing on just that aspect of the case improperly ignores
“the fact that an illegal seizure occurred.” United States v. Gallinger, 227 F.Supp.3d 1163, 1172
n.2 (D. Idaho 2017).  Rather, such an action, “which may in some sense be considered
‘voluntary,’ [does not] necessarily break the causal chain” between the unlawful police conduct
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and the defendant’s abandoning of the item. United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1014 (1982)
(in regard to the causation analysis, comparing this case to, inter alia, the abandonment case
United States v. Beck (discussed infra), and holding the officer’s unlawful arrest of the defendant
caused his flight, though ultimately holding there was an independent basis to justify the
subsequent search of his person), cert. denied.
As such, when the fact that a decision to discard or disavow property is made subsequent
to unlawful police conduct, the court should evaluate whether those actions “reflect the mere
coincidental  decision  of  [the  citizens]  to  discard  their  narcotics,”  and  they  do  not,  they  are  not
“voluntary” in the sense abandonment law requires.  United  States  v.  Beck, 602 F.3d 726, 730
(5th Cir. 1979); see State v. Schrecengost, 134 Idaho 547, 550 n.2 (Ct. App. 2000)
(distinguishing the facts of that case from other decisions, including Beck, which found
intentional  acts  abandoning  property  in  the  face  of  unlawful  conduct  were  not  “voluntary”
actions).  “[I]t would be sheer fiction to presume they were caused by anything other than the
illegal stop.” Beck, 602 F.3d at 230 (holding that, when the officer conducted an unlawful traffic
stop, the defendant’s decision to throw the marijuana out of his car while he was stopping was
the product of the unlawful police conduct, and so, could not be used to justify the subsequent
police activity).   In other words,  “the abandonment must be truly voluntary and not merely the
product of illegal police conduct,” if it is to be the basis for allowing evidence to be admissible in
the face of unlawful police conduct. Gallinger, 227 F.Supp.3d at 1172 (granting defendant’s
motion to suppress the contents of the discarded container) (emphasis added).
Thus, the question the courts evaluate when abandonment is an issue is whether there is a
causal connection between the defendant’s action and the unlawful police conduct, such that the
defendant’s action was the product of unlawful police conduct. Schrecengost, 134 Idaho at 549.
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That evaluation looks at the temporal proximity between the unlawful conduct and the
defendant’s action, the intervening circumstances between the unlawful conduct and the
defendant’s action, and the flagrancy of the unlawful conduct. Id.
The  State’s  argument  does  not  evaluate  any  of  those  factors.   (See generally Resp.
Br.,  pp.15-16.)   In  fact,  none  weigh  in  the  State’s  favor  in  this  case.   There  was  no  temporal
break between the unlawful conduct and Ms. Ibarra’s action in this case because she acted while
still being subjected to the unlawful additional restrictions. Compare State v. Ross, 160 Idaho
757, 759-60 (Ct. App. 2016) (holding the defendant could challenge the search of a bag even
though he had disavowed ownership while the officer was continuing to hold onto the bag in
question).  Similarly, there were no intervening circumstances since her action occurred during
while the unlawful conduct was ongoing. Compare Bailey, 691 F.2d at 1014 (explaining the
mere fact that the defendant chooses to act is not a sufficient intervening fact to break the causal
chain); Gallinger, 227 F.Supp.3d at 1172 (same).  In fact, the video shows nothing else
happened, since Ms. Ibarra was simply left to sit by herself in the booking area.  (See State’s
Exhibit 3.)
The misconduct was particularly flagrant in this case because, not only had the officers
done everything they were lawfully allowed to do, they had actually done some things the
Constitution forbade them to do (namely, interrogated Ms. Ibarra in violation of her right to an
attorney).   (See R., pp.121, 138-39, Tr., Vol.1, p.4, Ls.5-10.)  Even then, their extensive
investigation found no evidence of contraband, and yet, they still continued to detain Ms. Ibarra.
The flagrancy of that decision is highlighted by the fact that the officers did not continue to
similarly restrain the other women who they had been investigating at the same time and in
similar  manner.   (R.,  pp.127-28.)   As  such,  Ms.  Ibarra’s  decision  to  discard  the  container  was
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caused by the unlawful police conduct just as much as the defendant’s decision to disavow
ownership in Ross was.
The State tries to distinguish Ross on  the  basis  that,  in Ross, the officers had actually
seized the bag before the defendant abandoned it.  (Resp. Br., pp.15-16.)  That argument is
contrary to the decision in State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431 (Ct. App. 2006).  In Zuniga, the Court
of Appeals held that, when the defendant “disobeyed [the officer’s] order to remain seated and
fled from the scene, he was no longer the subject of an unlawful detention,” and so, he did not
have the ability to challenge the search of the container he discarded while he was fleeing. Id. at
437. It was the fact that that he was not being subjected to the unlawful detention at the moment
he discarded the container, not the fact that the officer had not yet taken the container from him,
which rendered him unable to challenge the search of that container. Id.; see also Schrecengost,
134 Idaho at 550 (explaining that the defendant’s attempt to discard the container after the
officer had found and seized it was not caused by the unlawful conduct because the illegal search
had effectively ended and the act of discarding was new conduct was sufficiently separate from
that unlawful conduct); but see, e.g., Gallinger, 227 F.Supp.3d 1172 n.2 (explaining that even a
defendant’s actions after being subjected to unlawful conduct does not necessarily break the
causal chain between the unlawful conduct and his actions because that would ignore the fact
that unlawful conduct occurred).  Therefore, the State’s focus on whether the officer had already
seized the container is contrary to the applicable precedent.
Ms. Ibarra was very clearly still being subjected to the unlawful detention at the moment
she discarded the object because she was still being handcuffed and detained in the booking area
without a reasonable basis at that time she acted.  (See State’s Exhibit 3.)  Therefore, under
Zuniga, the fact that the officer had not already seized the container is of no importance –
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Ms. Ibarra’s decision to discard it was still caused by the unlawful police conduct because that
decision was made while she was being subjected to the unlawful police conduct. See also
Schrecengost, 134 Idaho at 550 n.2 (distinguishing the facts from that case from those in several
cases where other courts had found that, where the defendant had discarded the object while the
unlawful police conduct was ongoing, the abandonment was the product of the unlawful
conduct).  As such, the totality of the circumstances reveal the State’s argument that Ms. Ibarra
voluntarily abandoned the container is, like the government’s argument in Beck, one of “sheer
fiction,” and should be rejected. Beck, 602 F.3d at 730.  Because her actions were caused by the
officers’ unlawful conduct, the fact that she discarded the container does not deprive her of the
ability to challenge the search of that container.
Since the contents of that container were found as a result of the officers’ violation of
Ms. Ibarra’s Fourth Amendment rights, the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress
that evidence.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Both Cases By Imposing Excessive Sentences On
Ms. Ibarra
The State’s responses concerning the excessiveness of Ms. Ibarra’s sentences are not
remarkable, and as such, no further reply is necessary in regard to those issues.  Accordingly,
Ms. Ibarra simply refers the Court back to pages 17-21 of her Appellant’s Brief.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Ibarra respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision denying her motion to
suppress in the contraband case.  She also respectfully requests this Court reduce both her
sentences as it deems appropriate, or alternatively, remand these cases for a new sentencing
hearing.
DATED this 1st day of May, 2018.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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